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Key points 
The  proposals  under  discussion  for  a  Single  Banking  Resolution  Regulation  establishing  a  centralised 
mechanism for countries participating in the Single Supervisory Mechanism and a Resolution Directive are 
generally well designed and coherent. Yet there is a need to streamline the procedures for deciding the start 
of resolution and managing the subsequent action, which now entail much overlap in the powers attributed 
to the institutions involved (the Commission, the Single Resolution Board and the European Central Bank). 
Further aspects requiring clarification concern the activation of the bail-in instrument, where there is a need 
to avoid the potential destabilising effects of an overly rigid approach; the design of the Single Resolution 
Fund, which must be paid by the financial industry but nonetheless needs a centralised fiscal backstop; and 
the legal basis of Article 114, which may prove insufficient to support the very intrusive powers attributed to 
the Single Resolution Board in the management of resolution. 
Recommendations 
Our key recommendations are i) that the assessment that a bank is failing or likely to fail and no private or 
supervisory alternative is available should be left to the ECB, and endorsed by the SRB and Commission with 
a fast-track procedure for the initiation of resolution completed within a weekend; ii) that bail-in be resorted 
to  parsimoniously  in  pre-resolution  phases,  notably  when  there  is  need  to  recapitalise  many  banks 
simultaneously; iii) that the ESM should be the first-line backstop for the Resolution Fund, and that the 
member states should also agree in advance on a ‘sharing key’ for a last resort backstop by national budgets, 
albeit only for the extreme case of a systemic crisis affecting large parts of the banking system; and iv) that, 
should Article 114 appear to offer a weak legal basis for the Single Resolution Mechanism, then the joint 
resort to Articles 114-cum-352 could also be considered. 
 2 | MICOSSI, BRUZZONE & CARMASSI  
 
1.  Introduction 
The  European  Commission  proposal  for  a 
Regulation  establishing  a  European  Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for banks is now 
under  consideration  before  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Council.1  The  main 
principles  and  tools  applicable  for  resolving  a 
failing  bank  are  contained  in  the  June  2012 
Commission  proposal  for  a  Directive  on  bank 
recovery  and  resolution  (BRR),  aimed  at 
harmonising crisis management and resolution 
tools in EU member states, which is also under 
consideration by the European legislators.2 Any 
discussion of the new system must therefore be 
based on both proposals.  
Resolution  is  an  essential  complement  to  the 
Single  Supervisory  Mechanism  (SSM),  whose 
constitutive  Council  Regulation  was  published 
in the Official Journal of the European Union in 
October.3  Supervision  and  resolution  are  two 
main  pillars  for  the  creation  of  a  European 
banking  union,  the  third  being  the  deposit 
                                                   
1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and  of  the  Council  establishing  uniform  rules  and  a 
uniform  procedure  for  the  resolution  of  credit 
institutions  and  certain  investment  firms  in  the 
framework  of  a  Single  Resolution  Mechanism  and  a 
Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation 
(EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of 
the  Council,  COM/2013/0520  final,  Brussels,  10  July 
2013. 
2 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and  of  the  Council  establishing  a  framework  for  the 
recovery  and  resolution  of  credit  institutions  and 
investment  firms  and  amending  Council  Directives 
77/91/EEC  and  82/891/EC,  Directives  2001/24/EC, 
2002/47/EC,  2004/25/EC,  2005/56/EC,  2007/36/EC 
and  2011/35/EC  and  Regulation  (EU)  No  1093/2010, 
COM/2012/0280 final, Brussels, 6 June 2012; Proposal 
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing a framework for the recovery and 
resolution  of  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms 
and  amending  Council  Directives  77/91/EEC  and 
82/891/EC,  Directives  2001/24/EC,  2002/47/EC, 
2004/25/EC,  2005/56/EC,  2007/36/EC  and 
2011/35/EC  and  Regulation  (EU)  No  1093/2010, 
General approach, Council of the European Union, 28 
June 2013. 
3  Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/2013  conferring 
specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning 
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions.  
guarantee  system:  on  this  last  matter,  the 
Council has not agreed to create a supranational 
system  –  mainly  due  to  some  member  states’ 
reservations  about  the  cross-border  pooling  of 
insurance  funds  –  and  has  asked  the 
Commission  to  limit  itself  to  a  directive 
harmonising national rules. The proposal, tabled 
by  the  Commission  in  July  2010  (European 
Commission,  2010),  is  still  pending  before 
legislators. 
As  proposed  by  the  Commission,  the  SRM 
should apply to all banks falling under the SSM, 
under  the  principle  that  all  banks  should  be 
treated  equally.  The  request  by  some  member 
states to exempt some banks – thus reopening a 
discussion  that  was  satisfactorily  settled  with 
the SSM Regulation – would create a second tier 
of  banks  exposed  to  supervisory  forbearance 
and,  in  general,  to  broader  discretion  in  the 
application  of  common  rules,  and  preserve 
current distortions in the internal market.     
Taken together, the legislation adopted or under 
consideration for the SSM, the SRM, and to an 
extent  also  deposit  insurance,  offers  a  well 
designed,  comprehensive  and  coherent 
framework  for  banking  union  that,  once  fully 
implemented, should restore the internal market 
for financial services and go a long way towards 
eradicating  moral  hazard  and  excessive  risk-
taking in the EU banking and financial system.  
This Policy Brief discusses the SRM Regulation 
and  the  BRR  Directive,  drawing  attention  to 
certain features that should be improved. They 
concern notably the initial decision to place an 
institution  under  resolution  (Paragraph  3),  the 
bail-in tool (Paragraph 4), the resolution fund(s) 
with  attendant  fiscal  backstop  question 
(Paragraph  5),  and  the  legal  basis  of  the  SRM 
Regulation  (Paragraph  6).  Paragraph  2 
illustrates the main contents of the proposals in 
order  to  facilitate  the  ensuing  discussion. 
Paragraph 7 concludes. 
2.  The three phases of bank crisis 
management 
Banks provide vital services to the economy (the 
operation  of  payment  systems,  deposit-taking 
and  lending).  However,  since  they  lend THE NEW EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING BANK CRISES | 3 
 
depositors’  money  on  a  fractional  reserve  or 
capital  basis  and  transform  maturities  –  and 
therefore do not have at all times the liquidity 
required  to  pay  back  depositors,  should  they 
want to withdraw their money simultaneously – 
they are exposed to confidence crises that may 
make them rapidly unviable. A run on a bank 
may rapidly spread to other banks, due to their 
close  interconnections  through  the  interbank 
market,  and  even  threaten  to  bring  down  an 
entire financial system. 
For this reason, most jurisdictions have special 
instruments to handle bank insolvencies, which 
in  the  main  are  managed  out  of  court  with 
administrative procedures making it possible to 
preserve the vital functions of the bank, protect 
depositors  and  prevent  one  bank’s  crisis  from 
spreading  to  other  banks  and  destroying 
confidence in the banking system. 
In  June  2012,  the  Eurozone  Summit  and  the 
European  Council4  decided  to  launch  the 
banking union project with the aim to break the 
vicious  circle  between  sovereign  debt  and 
national  banking  crises  that  threatened  the 
Union’s financial stability and the very survival 
of  the  euro.  Banking  union  is  instrumental  in 
restoring the single market in financial services 
and combating excessive risk-taking by bankers: 
notably by eliminating supervisory forbearance 
by  national  regulators  and  their  implicit 
guarantee that banks would not be allowed to 
fail, which is a major source of moral hazard. To 
this end, banking supervision and resolution – 
the endgame once a bank can no longer stand on 
its own – will be centralised with the SSM and 
SRM.  Against  this  background,  the  BRR 
Directive will ensure that all member states have 
the  harmonised  powers  and  procedures  to 
manage bank crises out of court, while the SRM 
Regulation  will  govern  decision-making  at  EU 
level  and  the  relationships  between  the 
Commission,  the  new  agency  for  bank 
                                                   
4 Euro Area Summit Statement, 29 June 2012; European 
Council  (2012),  “Towards  a  genuine  monetary  and 
economic  union”,  Report  by  the  Presidents  of  the 
European  Council,  the  European  Commission,  the 
Eurogroup and the European Central Bank, Brussels, 26 
June. 
resolution – the Single Resolution Board (SRB) – 
the ECB and national resolution authorities. 
Thus, resolution is an administrative procedure 
to  manage  bank  crises  out  of  court  so  as  to 
protect  financial  stability,  preserve  vital 
systemic functions and protect depositors, while 
minimising any adverse impact on taxpayers. It 
normally entails the resolution authority taking 
full control of the failing bank’s assets, liabilities 
and operations, with all the means and tools to 
reorganise it or wind it down. Key principles in 
the  European  legislation  under  discussion  are 
that  no  creditor  should  find  himself  worse  off 
than under a normal insolvency procedure; and 
that all decisions taken by resolution authorities 
should  be  subject  to  judicial  review.  These 
principles  guarantee  that  the  Union  procedure 
will  not  infringe  fundamental  rights  under 
national and European law. 
In the SRM Regulation and the BRR Directive, 
there  are  three  phases  to  bank  crisis 
management (see Figure 1): i) preparation and 
prevention;  ii)  early  intervention;  and  iii) 
resolution.  
Under preparation and prevention, banks will 
be required to draw up recovery plans detailing 
measures  and  actions  that  they  will  adopt  to 
restore  viability  when  in  distress;  these  plans 
must be assessed and approved by supervisors. 
In  turn,  the  resolution  authorities  (at  EU  and 
national  level)  will  have  to  prepare  resolution 
plans, explaining how a bank will be resolved 
while  protecting  systemic  functions  and 
financial stability and minimising the potential 
burden for taxpayers. Resolution authorities are 
also  required  to  identify  impediments  to 
resolvability  and  adopt  measures  that  can 
facilitate  it,  including  changes  in  banks’ 
structure  to  reduce  complexity;  limits  to 
maximum individual and aggregate exposures; 
reporting  requirements;  limitations  or 
prohibition of activities, products and business 
lines;  requirement  to  issue  additional 
convertible capital instruments. 4 | MICOSSI, BRUZZONE & CARMASSI  
 
Figure 1. The new EU framework for bank crisis management 
 
 
In this domain, the European Banking Authority 
(EBA)  will  develop  technical  standards  to 
ensure consistency across member states in the 
parameters  considered  to  assess  resolvability 
and  in  the  use  of  preventative  powers.  For 
member states that will participate in the SRM, 
the tasks related to resolution plans are assigned 
to  the  Single  Resolution  Board  established  by 
the SRM Regulation. 
Early intervention envisages a range of powers 
and tools that should be available to supervisors 
in  the  early  stage  when  a  bank’s  financial 
position  starts  to  deteriorate.  Under  the  BRR 
Directive,  national  supervisors  must  have  the 
power  to  require  the  bank:  to  adopt  measures 
outlined  in  the  recovery  plan;  to  draw  up  an 
action  programme  and  timetable  for  its 
implementation;  to  convene  a  shareholders’ 
meeting, proposing the agenda or the adoption 
of certain measures; and to prepare a plan for 
debt  restructuring.  Moreover,  when  the 
supervisor determines that the bank’s solvency 
may be at risk, it can appoint a special manager 
for a limited period of time who will take up all 
management powers (under the constraint of no 
prejudice to ordinary shareholders’ rights) with 
the  objective  of  restoring  the  viability  of  the 
institution. 
The  SSM  Regulation  attributes  strong  early 
intervention  powers  to  the  ECB  (Article  16) 
which are more pervasive than those assigned 
by the BRR Directive to national supervisors and 
basically  coincide  with  those  assigned  to 
national  supervisors  by  the  CRD  IV  (Article 
104)5. They include, among others: the request to 
hold  own  funds  in  excess  of minimum  capital 
requirements;  the  request  to  apply  a  specific 
provisioning policy; the restriction of activities 
and operations, including the request to divest 
                                                   
5 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of 
credit  institutions  and  the  prudential  supervision  of 
credit  institutions  and  investment  firms,  amending 
Directive  2002/87/EC  and  repealing  Directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. 
Resolution
Reorganization or winding up
SRB: sets out resolution scheme
National resolution authorities: execute resolution 
measures on SRB instructions
Early intervention 
ECB (SSM Member States) + 
national supervisors (BRRD, CRD IV)
ECB/national resolution authorities assessment
SRB recommendation
Commission decides entry into resolution and resolution framework
Bank failing 
or likely to 
fail
Preparation and prevention
Recovery plans (banks)
Resolution plans and resolvability assessment 
(SRB, national resolution authorities)
Financial 
conditions 
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activities posing excessive risks; the reduction of 
risks related to assets, products and systems; the 
restriction  or  prohibition  of  dividend 
distributions;  the  removal  of  management. 
These powers will apply to credit institutions (as 
well as financial holding companies comprising 
credit  institutions  and mixed  financial  holding 
companies)  legally  residing  in  member  states 
participating in the SSM. All early intervention 
actions,  taken  by  the  ECB  or  national 
supervisors,  must  be  communicated  to  the 
national  resolution  authorities  and  the  SRB, 
which in turn must notify the Commission.  
Resolution  begins  when  a  bank  is  failing  or 
likely to fail without any possibility of restoring 
its viability with a private sector or supervisory 
action, and when a resolution action is necessary 
in  the  public  interest,  i.e.  basically  to  preserve 
financial  stability  and  vital  systemic  functions. 
Given  the  specific  nature  of  the  banking 
business and the risk of contagion spreading to 
other banks, the procedure for resolving banks 
must  act  swiftly  to  protect  systemic  functions 
and  reassure  depositors.  Ordinary  insolvency 
proceedings  normally  cannot  guarantee  this 
result,  which  is  why  most  countries  already 
have  special  administrative  (out  of  court) 
procedures  to  handle  bank  resolution  (FSB, 
2013).  Specific  principles  and  tools  to  guide 
these procedures were developed by the Basel 
Cross-Border  Bank  Resolution  Group  (BCBS, 
2010)  and  the  Financial  Stability  Board  (FSB, 
2011).  
Competent resolution authorities, including the 
SRB  at  Union  level,  must  be  entrusted  with 
administrative  resolution  tools  including,  as  a 
minimum:  the  sale  of  business,  enabling 
authorities to sell an institution or part thereof 
without  shareholders’ approval;  the  setting up 
of a bridge institution, allowing authorities to 
transfer  an  institution  or  part  thereof  to  a 
publicly controlled entity, with the view to sell it 
to the private sector when market conditions are 
appropriate;  asset  separation,  to  be  applied  in 
combination with the other tools and entailing 
the  transfer  of  impaired  assets  to  an  asset 
management vehicle, which will then sell them 
to  the  market;  and  bail-in,  giving  resolution 
authorities  the  power  to  convert  debt 
instruments into equity or to write down claims 
of unsecured creditors.  
Under  the  BRR  Directive  it  falls  to  national 
resolution  authorities  to  initiate  the  resolution 
phase.  For  countries  participating  in  the  SSM 
and the SRM, the national resolution authorities 
and the ECB may indicate to the SRB the need to 
resolve  a  bank  (Article  16);  the  SRB,  in  turn, 
would  present  a  recommendation  to  the 
European  Commission,  containing  the  draft 
resolution framework. The decision to place the 
bank  in  resolution  is  then  taken  by  the 
Commission,  which  must  also  set  out  the 
framework  for  the  use  of  resolution  tools. 
Various  provisions  regulate  possible 
disagreements  between  the  SRB  and  the 
Commission,  as  well  as  the  possibility  for  the 
Commission  to  decide  on  own  initiative  when 
the SRB does not act (with an ECB opinion). The 
SRB  will  then  determine  the  precise  use  of 
resolution tools – the resolution scheme – and 
instruct  national  authorities  to  implement  it 
under  national  laws.  Should  a  national 
resolution  authority  not  comply  with  SRB 
decisions, the SRB can directly address executive 
orders to the troubled banks.  
In  the  Commission  proposal,  a  Single  Bank 
Resolution Fund will be set up under the control 
of the SRB, to ensure the availability of medium-
term  funding  support  while  the  bank  is 
restructured, and will be funded ex ante through 
risk-based contributions by the banks included 
in the SSM, in line with the rules set by the BRR 
Directive  for  national  resolutions  funds.  For 
member states in the SRM, the resolution fund 
will  replace  the  national  resolution  funds 
provided  for  by  the  BRR  Directive.  The  Fund 
will  be  allowed  to  intervene  only  after 
shareholders and creditors have contributed to 
loss  absorption  and  recapitalisation  for  an 
amount  of  at  least  8%  of  total  liabilities;  the 
maximum amount it can make available to an 
individual  bank  is  capped  at  5%  of  total 
liabilities (Article 24.7). 
Whenever  resolution  measures  entail  financial 
support  with  national  resources,  the 
Commission will assess them under the criteria 
for  state  aid  control  of  Article  107  TFEU.  In 
order to avoid distortions in the internal market, 6 | MICOSSI, BRUZZONE & CARMASSI  
 
these  criteria  will  also  be  applied  when  the 
financial  support  is  granted  by  the  Single 
Resolution Fund. The Commission decision on 
the resolution framework and the SRB decision 
on the resolution scheme will be conditional on 
a  positive  (and  separate)  decision  by  the 
Commission on the compatibility of public aid 
with the internal market. 
Under the Treaty, the European Court of Justice 
will  have  jurisdiction  over  the  legality  of 
decisions taken by the Commission and the SRB 
(Article 263 TFEU). For certain Board decisions 
an appeal panel will operate as a first instance 
chamber  (Article  37c  of  the  November  4 
Presidency  compromise  text).  Since  resolution 
measures  will  be  implemented  through  legal 
acts adopted by national resolution authorities, 
these acts will be subject to judicial review  by 
national  courts.  National  courts  will  also  be 
entitled  to  request  preliminary  rulings  of  the 
Court  of  Justice  on  the  validity  and 
interpretation of the acts of the Commission and 
SRB (Article 267 TFEU). The Regulation sets out 
the  competence  of  the  Court  of  Justice  for  the 
determination  of  non-contractual  liabilities  of 
the Commission and the Board stemming from 
the  exercise  of  the  powers  under  the  SRM 
Regulation. 
The SRB will be established as a special Union 
agency  and  will  comprise  an  executive  body 
charged with decisions in individual cases and a 
plenary  session  including  representatives  of 
national  resolution  authorities  of  all 
participating  member  states..  The  ECB  will 
designate  one  representative  in  the  executive 
body  as  a  “permanent  observer”.  A  key  issue 
still under discussion in the Council is whether 
to  grant  a  special  role  in  the  resolutions 
decisions  to  the  national  representative  of  the 
institution  home  country,  at  least  in  an  initial 
phase  (cf.  Presidency  General  Approach  of 
November 11, 2013). Of course, there is a great 
danger  here  that  national  forbearance,  pushed 
out  through  the  door,  re-enters  the  room 
through an open window. 
3.  Resolution initiation  
The start of the resolution procedure entails the 
transfer of the control of the failing bank to the 
resolution  authority,  with  a  significant 
compression  of  shareholders’  rights:  were  this 
crucial step to be mishandled, the initiation of 
resolution could become a source of instability 
as investors and creditors scramble for the door. 
Therefore, it is of the essence that the procedure 
for placing a financial institution in resolution is 
rapid  and  effective  while  ensuring  water-tight 
confidentiality.  The  procedures  envisaged  by 
the SRM Regulation, depicted in Figure 1, may 
fall somewhat short of these requirements.  
Under the draft SRM Regulation,6 the procedure 
for placing a bank into resolution starts with an 
assessment by the ECB, or a national resolution 
authority after consulting the ECB, that i) a bank 
is failing or likely to fail (Article 16.2a), and ii) 
there  is  no  reasonable  prospect  that  any 
alternative private sector or supervisory action 
would  prevent  its  failure  within  a  reasonable 
timeframe  (Article  16.2b).  Were  this  to  be  the 
case,  the  finding  must  be  communicated 
without delay to the Commission and the SRB 
(Article  16.1).  The  conditions  under  which  a 
bank may be judged to be “failing or likely to 
fail”  are  listed  in  Article  16.3:  the  bank  is  in 
breach  of  requirements  for  authorisation  (e.g. 
insufficient capital); its net worth is negative; it 
is or will soon be unable to pay its debts; and 
there  is  a  need  for  extraordinary  public 
support.7  Any  one  of  these  circumstances  is 
sufficient  to  justify  the  communication  to start 
the resolution procedure.  
The  Regulation  then  requires  that,  upon 
receiving  the  communication,  the  Board  shall 
verify  again  the  existence  of  the  conditions  of 
Article  16.2.a  and  16.2b  as  well  as  assess 
whether a resolution action is necessary in the 
public  interest  (Article  16.2c):  where  “public 
interest”  means  that  the  resolution  action 
achieves,  and  is  proportionate  to  the 
achievement  of  one  or  more  of  the  resolution 
objectives  –  i.e.  ensure  critical  functions, 
preserve financial stability, minimise taxpayers’ 
exposures  and  protect  depositors  –  and  that 
                                                   
6 In this analysis we refer to the Presidency compromise 
text of the Regulation of 4.11.2013. 
7 Public support may not always mean that the bank is 
failing or likely to fail (Article 16.3d). We return later to 
this issue. THE NEW EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING BANK CRISES | 7 
 
normal insolvency procedures would not meet 
those objectives to the same extent (Article 16.4). 
If the Board finds that all conditions are met, it 
will  then  send  out  a  recommendation  to  the 
Commission that should include a draft decision 
to start the resolution procedure, along with the 
draft  ‘framework’  of  the  resolution  tools  to  be 
utilised and the draft ‘framework’ for the use of 
the Single Bank Resolution Fund (Article 16.5).  
These frameworks define and limit the actions 
to be undertaken by the SRB, and thus the scope 
of  the  resolution  measures,  including  the 
conversion or write down of credits; the possible 
exclusion  of  certain  liabilities  from  the  bail-in 
tool, and the conditions for the intervention of 
the  resolution  fund.  These  being  the  decisions 
that  produce  the  largest  interference  with 
private rights, it seems appropriate that they are 
formally taken by the Commission, as discussed 
further in Paragraph 5.  
Upon receipt of the Board recommendation, in 
order to take its decisions the Commission must 
again, and in full independence, assess whether 
all the conditions for starting resolution are met 
(Article 16.6). It may decide not to adopt the SRB 
recommendation and send it back with requests 
for amendments. If the Board does not comply 
by a deadline set by the Commission (normally, 
no  fewer  than  five  working  days),  then  the 
Commission  may  adopt  the  decision  with  its 
own amendments. The Commission would also 
possess a right of initiative: after receiving the 
communication  from  the  ECB  or  national 
resolution  authorities,  or  even  without  such 
communication,  the  Commission  may  require 
the  Board  to  submit  a  recommendation  and 
draft decision. If the Board does not comply, the 
Commission may nonetheless go ahead and take 
the decision. The Board is also entitled to ask the 
Commission to amend the frameworks for the 
resolution tools and the use of the Fund (Article 
16.12).  If  the Commission  decides  not  to place 
the  entity  under  resolution,  then  the  national 
insolvency law will apply. 
The  Commission  decision  is  addressed  to  the 
SRB;  the  latter,  in  turn,  will  draw  up  the 
resolution  scheme  (Article  20),  and  instruct 
national  resolution  authorities  to  proceed 
accordingly.  For  example,  with  regard  to  the 
bail-in  tool,  the  scheme  must  establish  the 
amount  by  which  eligible  liabilities  must  be 
reduced  or  converted,  the  objectives  and 
minimum content of the business reorganisation 
plan required by the bail-in framework, and the 
like  (Article  24.1).  National  resolution 
authorities are then responsible for the adoption 
of resolution measures within their jurisdiction, 
and the SRB will monitor their behaviour in the 
execution of the resolution scheme (Article 16.8).  
This cumbersome apparatus clearly reflects the 
attempt to establish a balance between the main 
interests  involved:  the  ECB,  the  national 
resolution  authorities,  the  SRB  and  the 
Commission.  However,  it  does  not  only  seem 
overly complex but also incompatible with the 
requirements  of  speed,  decisiveness  and 
confidentiality  needed  to  move  from  the  early 
intervention  phase  to  resolution.  The 
intervention  of  multiple  actors  entitled  to 
participate  in  the  decisions,  the  passage  of 
information and documentary material between 
them,  and  the  complex  procedural  steps  are 
bound  to  take  time  and  generate  leaks  and 
rumours, notably when there are different views 
on  whether  and  how  to  proceed.  Any  leak  of 
sensitive  information  could  destroy  confidence 
and result in a run on the bank before the entity 
is  placed  into  resolution,  thus  frustrating  the 
very  aim  of  the  procedure.  It  would  be 
advisable,  in  this  regard,  to  strengthen  the 
provisions  on  professional  secrecy  and 
confidentiality  of  information  contained  in  the 
proposal (Article 79) with adequate sanctions so 
as to ensure effective deterrence. 
As  for  the  complexity  of  the  institutional 
architecture, in its legal opinion on the SRM the 
ECB  stresses  the  importance  of  avoiding  any 
overlap of supervisory powers and, to this end, 
they claim sole responsibility of the supervisor 
both  in  regard  of  early  intervention  measures 
and  in  the  assessment  that  an  institution  is 
failing  or  likely  to  fail  (ECB  2013).8  In  this 
manner, the transition from early intervention to 
resolution would be free of political interference 
                                                   
8 The ECB also proposes to eliminate the proposed duty 
for  the  ECB  or  national  supervisors  to  consult  the 
resolution  authorities  before  taking  additional  early 
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and taken far out of sight of banking markets. 
Any  ‘threshold’  effect  of  the  decision  to  start 
resolution would thus be minimised. 
The twin goals of simplifying and streamlining 
the  procedure  and  constraining  it  within  a 
tighter timeframe could be achieved by leaving 
resolution entirely in the hands of the SSM at the 
ECB,  as  a  natural  extension  of  the  early 
intervention  phase.  This  unitary  approach  has 
been adopted in the US with the FDIC, and by a 
number  of  European  countries  (e.g.  Italy, 
Germany and the UK), but is not acceptable to 
other member states, which consider resolution 
a  separate  function  requiring  their  direct 
involvement.  A  solution  entrusting  this 
competence  to  the  ECB  would  also  require  a 
change  in  the  Treaty,  to  the  extent  that 
resolution cannot be seen as an integral part of 
supervision as referred to by Article 127.6 of the 
TFEU.  
An  alternative,  which  would  be  easier  to 
implement,  is  to  let  the  ECB,  and  national 
supervisors  for  countries  not  in  the  SSM, 
indicate when resolution must start, as the last 
act of early intervention, and then transfer the 
resolution procedure to the SRB.  
More precisely, one may envisage the following 
steps:  
(i)  Since in reality only the ECB and national 
supervisors (which at national level mostly 
coincide with the resolution authorities; cf. 
FSB,  2013)  possess  all  the  information 
required  to  start  the  procedure,  the 
assessment  by  the  ECB  and  national 
resolution authorities that a bank is failing 
or likely to fail should normally be taken for 
granted  and  not  repeated  by  the  SRB  and 
the  Commission;  the  initial  assessment 
could  only  be  overturned  in  narrowly 
defined, exceptional circumstances (a gross 
error of fact); any separate initiative by the 
Commission to place an entity in resolution 
should also be excluded;  
(ii)  Under  the  proposed  procedures,  it  is 
already  envisaged  that  the  SRB  and  the 
national  resolution  authorities  (for  non-
SRM members) are alerted to the difficulties 
of a bank or banking group as soon as the 
ECB, or national supervisors, activate early 
intervention  measures.  Article  11  of  the 
SRM  Regulation  already  prescribes  that, 
after receiving such information, the Board 
“may  prepare”  for  the  resolution  of  the 
entity: this provision could be strengthened 
by  requiring  the  SRB  “to  prepare 
immediately”  for  the  resolution  of  the 
entity,  so  that  they  will  be  able  to  react 
instantaneously  and  send  their 
recommendation to the Commission within 
hours of receiving the ECB communication.9 
It  would  also  be  useful  to  clarify  that  the 
SRB  and  national  resolutions  authorities 
should  make  reference,  in  this  activity,  to 
the  bank’s  resolution  plan  (which,  as  may 
be recalled, is an official document prepared 
by the resolution authorities);10 
(iii) As  to  the  Commission,  clearly  their 
intervention  in  the  procedure  cannot  be 
reduced to rubberstamping, since the final 
decision of legality and conformity with the 
Treaty can only be taken by them; what can 
be  done  is  to  concentrate  their  assessment 
on the criteria of “public interest” required 
for placing a bank in resolution, and for the 
rest  the  Commission  should  ascertain  that 
all  requirements  for  the  decision,  as 
reflected in the SRB recommendation, have 
been respected. 
With this simplified procedure, the decision to 
place  the  entity  in  resolution  may  be  taken 
within  a  very  short  time  span  –  thus  also 
shutting the door to political negotiations. The 
Commission decision on the frameworks for the 
use of resolution tools and recourse to the Fund 
may  well  be  taken  at  a  later  stage,  also  in 
conjunction  with  the  separate  decision  to  be 
taken under the state aid rules. The maximum 
                                                   
9 On this, the ECB legal opinion stresses the need that, 
during the early intervention phase, the SRB avoid any 
direct  activities in  contact  with  third  parties,  to avoid 
undermining  market  confidence  and  aggravating  the 
institution’s conditions. 
10 In line with the ECB legal opinion, the actions that the 
SRB and national resolution authorities may undertake 
in  preparation  for  resolution  should  not  include  the 
possibility to contact potential purchasers of the bank’s 
assets and business lines (Article 11.3c of the Regulation 
and  23.1a  of  the  Directive),  since  such  an  initiative is 
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time lapse between the initial ECB or national 
resolution  authority  communication  and  the 
decision by the Commission, should in no event 
exceed  48  hours.  Whenever  possible,  the 
procedure  should  be  started  after  the  close  of 
business on Friday afternoon.  
A  related,  but  separate  problem  concerns  the 
criteria  to  be  considered  when  deciding  the 
point  of  entry  into  resolution,  and  specifically 
whether  the  institution  entrusted  with  the 
power to start resolution should be bound to act 
by objective indicators of distress. As has been 
described,  the  BRR  Directive  and  the  SRM 
Regulation indicate that resolution should start 
when  “a  bank  is  failing  or  likely  to  fail”,  and 
placing  it  into  resolution  is  “necessary  in  the 
public  interest”.  This  assessment  shall  be 
conducted  by  the  ECB  supervisory  Board  for 
banks  subject  to  the  SSM  and  by  national 
resolution  authorities  for  banks  in  non-
participating countries.  
Taking the latter first, leaving full discretion to 
national  authorities  would  not  guarantee  the 
eradication  from  the  system  of  supervisory 
forbearance,  which  was  rampant  in  the  events 
leading to the financial crisis. Therefore, there is 
merit in providing the ECB and other interested 
parties  with  objective  triggers  for  starting 
resolution,  as  this  may  limit  the  room  for 
disagreement and political meddling within the 
SSM  and  SRB  supervisory  boards  (which  are 
mainly made up of national representatives) and 
the Commission. 
An  objective  trigger  may  only  work  if  it  is 
timely,  easy  to  read,  and  unambiguous  in 
signalling  fundamental  distress.  Based  on 
extensive empirical evidence collected since the 
financial crisis erupted in 2008, the metric that 
best  meets  these  criteria  is  (the  inverse  of) 
absolute  leverage,  that  is  the  ratio  of  bank 
capital – with equity valued at market prices – to 
total  assets  or  liabilities  (Calomiris  &  Herring 
2011, Carmassi & Micossi 2012).  
Following  the  system  of  Prompt  Corrective 
Action (PCA) pioneered by the FDIC, the EBA 
and  SRB  should  be  asked  to  identify  a  set  of 
“capital zones” corresponding to a presumption 
of  corrective  action  of  increasing  intensity  by 
supervisors,  from  various  measures  of  early 
intervention  down  to  resolution.  Capital 
thresholds  should  be  public,  thus  allowing 
financial markets to fully exercise Basel “Pillar 
Three” market discipline on banks.11 Under this 
system,  banking  supervisors  may  still  decide 
that they do not want to act but would have to 
explain their decision. 
Any injection of public funds into a bank by the 
resolution  authority  will  trigger  a  separate 
procedure  for  the  examination  of  its 
compatibility with internal market rules under 
the  state  aid  policy;  the  evaluation  of 
compatibility with internal market rules will be 
undertaken more generally, also when there is 
an  injection  of  funds  not  involving  state  aid 
(Recital  18).  This  activity  will  remain  separate 
from  the  resolution  decisions  and  the 
Commission  decision  on  the  resolution 
framework shall not be taken until the decision 
under  the  state  aid  policy  has  been  adopted 
(Article 16a.1).  
4.  The bail-in tool 
The approach to banking rescues in the EU has 
evolved remarkably since the financial crisis hit 
European  banks  in  2008.  Initially,  under  the 
shock  of  the  dramatic  failure  of  Lehman 
Brothers, European governments and especially 
the ECB held the view that no losses should be 
imposed on bank creditors, let alone depositors, 
for fear the financial system would collapse. A 
main argument in favour of this approach was 
that the authorities did not have resolution tools 
permitting those financial institutions fail while 
limiting  systemic  repercussions  on  financial 
markets. Thus it was that creditors were by and 
large – albeit not always – shielded from losses 
in  large  banking  groups  rescues,  e.g.  in 
Germany, Ireland and the UK in 2008-09.  
                                                   
11 The Basel II framework (BCBS, 2006), which revised 
the Basel I rules, envisaged three “pillars” of discipline, 
the first being the minimum capital requirements, the 
second, the principles for the supervisory review, and 
the third, market discipline and transparency through 
disclosure  requirements.  The  Basel  III  framework, 
adopted at the end of 2010, has maintained the three-
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Attitudes  started  to  change  in  2011,  following 
the  second  rescue  package  for  Greece,  which 
entailed substantial losses for holders of Greek 
government  bonds,  including  banks  and  their 
shareholders,  under  the  new  Private  Sector 
Involvement  (PSI)  approach  decided  by  the 
European  Council.  In  October  2011,  the 
Financial  Stability  Board  recommended  that 
‘bail-in’  of  private  creditors  be  explicitly 
included  among  resolution  tools  in  all 
jurisdictions (FSB, 2011). And indeed in 2012-13 
bank  rescues  have  been  characterised  by 
increasing  participation  in  the  losses  by 
subordinated  and  junior  creditors,  even  if  not 
always  and  with  considerable  variation  of 
approach in different cases (cf. Dübel, 2013, and 
Veròn, 2013). In the Cyprus banking rescue, in 
the  spring  of  2013,  the  Troika  required  that 
losses be inflicted not only on unsecured senior 
creditors  but,  more  poignantly,  on  uninsured 
depositors  at  Laiki  Bank  and  Bank  of  Cyprus. 
This  last  step  was  later  regretted  for  its 
potentially  disruptive  impact  on  depositor 
confidence  throughout  the  Union,  and 
numerous official statements tried to assure that 
it would not happen again. 
By  now,  involving  shareholders  and  creditors 
first,  whenever  public  funds  are  deployed  to 
avoid a bank failure or, at any rate, when a bank 
enters  a  resolution  procedure,  has  become  an 
official  Union  policy  –  enshrined  in  the  draft 
resolution  Regulation  and  Directive,  the 
European  Stability  Mechanism  (ESM)  rules  for 
the recapitalisation of financial institutions, and 
the  Commission  Guidelines  on  state  aid  to 
banks.  
The  resolution  Directive  and  Regulation 
empower  the  resolution  authorities  to  write 
down or convert debt instruments into equity as 
soon as a bank is placed in resolution, regardless 
of  whether  the  bail-in  instrument  is  activated 
(respectively, Articles 51 and 18 in the two draft 
proposals).  The  resolution  Directive  and 
Regulation  list  the  classes  of  liabilities  always 
excluded  from  the  scope  of  the  bail-in  tool, 
which include guaranteed deposits and secured 
liabilities,  as  well  as  interbank  liabilities  with 
original  maturities  of  less  than seven  days  (cf. 
respectively  Articles  38.2  and  24.3);12  deposit 
guarantee  schemes  will  bear  losses  in  lieu  of 
guaranteed deposits, but shall not be required to 
make any contribution for the recapitalisation of 
a bridge bank (Article 99 of the Directive); non-
guaranteed deposits will be included only after 
all  other  eligible  creditors  have  been  hit. 
Derivatives are not automatically exempted but 
may  be  excluded  from  the  application  of  the 
bail-in tool (Articles 38 and 44 of the Directive).13 
Non-excluded liabilities will be bailed-in on the 
basis  of  their  pecking  order  in  national 
insolvency laws, which the Directive purports to 
harmonise. The same pecking order for bail-in is 
present  in  the  SRM  Regulation  (Article  15):14 
Common Equity Tier 1 comes first, followed by 
additional  Tier  1  and  Tier  2  instruments, 
subordinated debt, unsecured claims and finally 
uncovered deposits, and the deposit guarantee 
scheme in lieu of guaranteed depositors, which 
are therefore excluded. 
A question that may deserve clarification in the 
legal texts is the hierarchy for the exercise of the 
write-down  and  conversion  of  creditor  claims. 
On  this,  the  proposals  do  not  clarify  whether 
and under what circumstances one tool would 
apply rather than the other, leaving de facto the 
decision  to  the  resolution  framework;  but  one 
cannot overlook the need for a general rule to 
preserve equal treatment of creditors of different 
banks that may fall under resolution.15    
                                                   
12  Other  exempted  instruments  are:  liabilities  to 
employees  of  failing  institutions,  such  as  fixed  salary 
and  pension  benefits;  commercial  claims  relating  to 
goods and services critical for the daily functioning of 
the institution; liabilities arising from a participation in 
payment systems, which have a remaining maturity of 
less than seven days.  
13  If  they  are  not  excluded,  resolution  authorities  can 
apply  the  bail-in  only  upon  or  after  closing  out  the 
derivatives.  Upon  entry  into  resolution,  resolution 
authorities shall be empowered to terminate and close 
out any derivative contract for this purpose (Article 44 
of the BRR Directive).  
14  In  its  legal  opinion,  the  ECB  maintains  that  there 
remain  differences  between  the  Regulation  and  the 
Directive that must be eliminated. 
15  In  its  State  Aid  Guidelines,  the  Commission  has 
indicated that conversion alone may apply when there 
is  a  capital  shortfall  but  the  bank  meets  minimum 
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A  further  question  concerns  the  inclusion  of 
uncovered  deposits  in  the  list  of  ‘bail-inable’ 
instruments.  The  EU  approach  contrasts  with 
the  US  system  where  depositor  preference 
applies to both insured and uninsured deposits. 
Systematically,  the  approach  taken  in  the  EU 
proposals appears logically inconsistent as non-
guaranteed deposits would be the only liabilities 
redeemable on demand which could be called in 
to  cover  emerging  losses  (sight  interbank 
liabilities  are  excluded,  as  was  recalled). 
Deposits  are  also  not  considered  among  bail-
inable resources under the state aid policy. On 
the other hand, large deposits would only come 
in last, after tapping all other eligible creditors; 
substantial eligible liabilities would in all cases 
be  available  before  calling  in  uncovered 
deposits,  following  the  provision  requiring  a 
minimum  amount  of  bail-inable  liabilities  (see 
below).  In  any  event,  a  likely  effect  of  this 
provision would be to encourage depositors to 
split  up  their  holdings  in  below-threshold 
deposits  at  different  banks,  making  it  de  facto 
irrelevant.  All  in  all,  full  depositor  preference 
appears to be a preferable solution.    
An important element of flexibility is introduced 
by  the  provision  allowing  national  authorities 
and  the  SRB  to  exclude  liabilities,  entirely  or 
partially, in certain special circumstances: if they 
cannot be bailed-in within a reasonable time; to 
ensure continuity of critical functions; to avoid 
contagion;  to  avoid  value  destruction  that 
would  raise  losses  borne  by  other  creditors 
(Articles  38.3c  of  the  Directive  and  24.5  of  the 
Regulation). 
The  principle  that  shareholders  and  creditors 
should be the first in line to bear bank losses is 
also included in the ESM framework for direct 
bank recapitalisation, whose operational details 
are  still  under  negotiation:  capital  injection  by 
the  ESM  into  distressed  banks  can  only  take 
place after an adequate capital contribution by 
shareholders (capital write-down) and creditors 
(debt conversion into equity or write-offs) of the 
beneficiary  institution,  in  line  with  state  aid 
rules  and  the  BRR  Directive  (ESM,  2013a). 
Moreover,  a  significant  participation  in  the 
capital injection of the member state where the 
bank is established is required as a condition for 
ESM recapitalisation. Specifically:  
a)  if  the  beneficiary  institution  has  a  capital 
level  lower  than  the  legal  minimum 
Common  Equity  Tier  1  of  4.5%,  the 
requesting ESM member will be required to 
make a capital injection to reach this level, 
as a precondition for the ESM intervention;  
b)  if the beneficiary institution already meets 
the  capital  ratio  mentioned  above,  the 
requesting  country  will  have  to  make  a 
capital  contribution  alongside  the  ESM  of 
20% of the total public contribution in the 
first  two  years  after  bank  recapitalisation 
and 10% in following years. 
The resolution Directive and Regulation entrust 
the  resolution  authorities  with  the  power  to 
determine  the  minimum  level  of  ‘bail-inable’ 
liabilities that each bank must hold (respectively 
Articles 39 and 10), measured as a proportion of 
total  liabilities  excluding  those  arising  from 
derivatives  and  covered  bonds  issued  by  non-
depository  institutions.  The  provision  aims  to 
ensure  that  banks have  a sufficient  cushion  of 
loss-absorbing  liabilities  at  their  disposal  and 
avoid  an  excess  of  unencumbered  liabilities 
jeopardising their loss-absorbing capacity. 
In  this  regard  Calomiris  and  Herring  (2011) 
recommended that each bank or banking group 
be  required  to  issue  debt  instruments  that 
convert automatically into equity when certain 
predetermined  market  triggers  –  identified 
under a PCA approach as has been recalled – are 
hit, for an amount equal to at least 10% of total 
book  value  assets.  The  automaticity  of 
conversion into equity of a substantial share of 
bail-inable  liabilities  would  greatly  strengthen 
market discipline on managers and shareholders 
through  a  credible  promise  of  dilution  as 
operating losses dent capital (cf. also Carmassi 
and Micossi, 2012). This approach may usefully 
complement  the  proposed  approach  in  the 
various  EU  proposals  under  discussion  where 
bail-in  is  activated  by  a  discretionary  decision 
taken on a case by case basis. 
An important question arises in connection with 
the activation of the bail-in tool when there is an 
injection of public funds into an ailing bank by 
national authorities or the ESM before resolution 
is opened, in order to keep the bank afloat and 
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become  a  hot  issue,  should  the  asset  quality 
review and stress tests to be undertaken by the 
ECB and EBA before the start of the SSM lead to 
ascertain  significant  and  widespread  capital 
shortfalls in the eurozone banking system.  
The question arises because there is a risk that 
the  principles  developed  for  resolution  by  the 
Directive  and  the  Regulation  are  extended  to 
pre-resolution  interventions  somewhat  a-
critically.  On  this,  the  Directive  and  the 
Regulation  provide  that  an  injection  of  public 
funds  into  a  bank  is  one  of  the  circumstances 
indicating that the bank is failing or likely to fail 
(Article 16.3d of the SRM Regulation and Article 
27.2d of the BRR Directive), opening the way to 
debt  write-down  or  compulsory  conversion. 
However, even in these extreme circumstances 
the  current  texts  recognise  that public  support 
may not always entail that the bank is failing or 
likely to fail, notably when, in order to remedy a 
serious  disturbance  in  the  economy  and 
preserve financial stability, it concerns a solvent 
institution and takes the form of:  
(i)  a state guarantee to back liquidity facilities 
provided by central banks; 
(ii)  a state guarantee of newly issued liabilities;  
(iii) an  injection  of  own  funds  or  purchase  of 
capital  instruments  whose  terms  and 
conditions do not confer an advantage upon 
the entity.  
The  room  for  flexibility  in  imposing  losses  on 
private creditors takes on enhanced importance 
when  a  bank  needs  public  help  but  is  not  in 
resolution. Indeed, while in the resolution phase 
the bank is in public hands and creditors’ claims 
are  handled  under  predetermined  principles 
and procedures for loss allocation, making the 
write-down or conversion of debt automatic in 
the earlier stage of crisis management is liable to 
generate a run on a solvent bank and make it 
insolvent, possibly destabilising other banks and 
the banking system as a whole.  
According to press reports (Christie et al., 2013), 
this is precisely the question raised by the ECB 
President Draghi in a confidential letter sent last 
summer  to  Competition  Commissioner 
Almunia,  in  response  to  the  new  Commission 
guidelines  on  state  aid  rules  for  banks 
(European Commission, 2013). These guidelines 
require  member  states  to  submit  a  capital-
raising plan before or as part of the submission 
of a restructuring plan for an ailing bank. The 
plan  should  contain  burden-sharing  measures 
by the shareholders and subordinated creditors 
of the bank.16 As was recalled, these rules would 
also  apply  to  injections  of  public  funds  into 
ailing banks by the ESM. In this letter, President 
Draghi reportedly said that those rules needed 
to  be  clarified  so  as  to  make  it  possible  for 
regulators to order technically solvent banks to 
strengthen their balance sheets without scaring 
off investors; and that public capital needs to be 
available  –  without  wiping  out  subordinated 
debt holders or forcing them to convert to equity 
–  if  a  bank’s  holdings  are  above  regulatory 
minimums  but  below  what  supervisors  deem 
necessary in a particular case, e.g. as a result of a 
stress  test,  which  he  dubbed  ‘precautionary 
recapitalisation’.  
The approach that is being developed in Europe 
may be usefully compared with that followed by 
the  US  authorities  in  the  2008  financial  crisis 
with the Capital Purchase Program (CPP, under 
the  broader  TARP  program),  which  has  been 
successful in restoring the viability of much of 
the US banking system through the provision of 
abundant and cheap ‘bridge financing’. The CPP 
was  designed  to  bolster  the  capital  of  ailing 
institutions,  in  extremely  adverse  economic 
conditions, so as to release the flow of credit to 
the  economy  and  restore  confidence.  To  this 
end,  the  US  Treasury  initially  committed  $250 
billion,  and  eventually  invested  about  $205 
billion,  to  provide  capital  to  707  financial 
institutions throughout the country. Against the 
capital  injections,  the  Treasury  received 
preferred  (non-voting)  stock  yielding  a  5% 
dividend  for  the  first  five  years  and  9% 
                                                   
16 The private sector contribution can take the form of 
either  a  conversion  into  Common  Equity  Tier  1  (the 
highest  quality  capital)  or  a  write-down  of  the  debt 
principal. Senior creditors, insured as well as uninsured 
deposits, bonds and all other senior debt are explicitly 
excluded  from  the  scope  of  application  of  this 
requirement. The ‘no creditor worse off’ principle has to 
be  respected,  i.e.  “subordinated  creditors  should  not 
receive  less  in  economic  terms  than  what  their 
instrument would have been worth if no State aid were 
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thereafter,  but  there  was  no  deadline  for  the 
investment  and  little  intrusion  into  the  banks’ 
business decisions. As of 30 September 2013, the 
Treasury has recovered more than $225 billion 
from  CPP  from  dividend  income  and 
repayments  and  expects  to  recover  additional 
funds. 
Clearly, there is here a difficult balancing act to 
undertake.  On  the  one  hand,  the  expectation 
that public support will be available may keep 
moral hazard alive among bankers; the issue is 
aggravated, in the EU context, by the presence 
of multiple regulatory and resolution authorities 
side by side with those of the Union. Experience 
has shown that, especially when a large banking 
institution is concerned, national regulators are 
all too willing to protect national champions and 
forbear  their  sins.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
generalised promise that financial support may 
always be preceded automatically by activation 
of the bail-in instrument may be destabilising.  
On  this,  the  new  Commission  guidelines  on 
state aid already contain a safeguard clause that 
may  be  activated  to  suspend  bail-in  “where 
implementing  such  measures  would  endanger 
financial  stability  or  lead  to  disproportionate 
results”  (paragraph  45).  The  new  Presidency 
compromise text of November 4 goes one step 
further  by  recalling  how  in  the  past  the 
Commission  was  able  to  find  an  appropriate 
balance between the potentially conflicting goals 
of  financial  stability  and  competition  (Recital 
18b of the SRM Regulation). 
5.  Resolution fund and fiscal 
backstop 
Even  if  the  system  is  designed  to  ensure  that 
losses  fall  entirely  on  shareholders  and 
creditors, it must nonetheless be backed up by 
adequate  financial  resources  to  support 
resolution  actions  and  lend  credibility  to  the 
resolution goals. For this purpose both the SRM 
Regulation  and  the  BRR  Directive  provide  for 
resolution funds to back their activities. At the 
end  of  the  road,  there  is  also  a  need  for  last 
resort  fiscal  backstop  to  cover  residual  losses, 
notably in the case of systemic crises.  
The establishment of the Single Bank Resolution 
Fund  (SBRF)  and  attendant  fiscal  backstop 
remain  contentious  issues  in  the  negotiations 
under  way  in  the  European  Parliament  and 
Council. Some member states would still prefer, 
at  least  for  an  initial  transitional  phase  of 
extended  duration,  to  set  up  a  network  of 
national  resolution  funds.  There  is  little  doubt 
that  such  a  solution  would  not  guarantee  the 
availability  of  resources  and  the  effective 
operation  of  the  Fund  in  case  of  need,  as 
individual  national  funds  could  refuse 
participation in individual operations when they 
disagreed. Not only the required mutualisation 
of risk, but also the subtraction of decision from 
national  interests  would  be  utterly 
compromised. Without these features, the SRM 
would lack effectiveness and credibility; while, 
on the other hand, the issues to be resolved in 
order to have a strong and credible system are in 
substance  less  contentious  than  commonly 
perceived.   
The tasks of the SBRF are spelled out in Article 
71.1 of the SRM Regulation and they include the 
following:  
(a) guarantee assets or liabilities or make loans 
to the bank under resolution, its subsidiaries, 
a bridge institution or an asset management 
vehicle;  
(b) purchase the assets of the institution under 
resolution;  
(c)  contribute capital to a  bridge institution or 
an asset management vehicle;  
(d) compensate  shareholders  and  creditors  in 
case  they  have  received  less  than  under 
normal insolvency proceedings;  
(e)  make a contribution to the institution in lieu 
of  bail-in-able  creditor  resources  when 
certain  creditors  have  been  excluded  from 
bail-in for reasons of systemic stability; the 
fund  contribution  may  not  exceed  5%  of 
total  liabilities  and  only  after  shareholders 
and creditors have contributed at least 8% of 
total  liabilities  to  the  costs  related  to  loss 
absorption or recapitalisation (Article 24.7). 
The  Commission  framework  for  resolution  is 
required  to  specify  “any  use  of  the  Fund  in 
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the maximum amount that may be used (Article 
16.5  of  the  Regulation).  The  SRB  will  further 
decide  the  specific  amounts  and  purposes  for 
use  of  the  Fund  (Article  20).  As  may  be  seen 
from the list above, all functions performed by 
the  Fund  are  strictly  meant  to  facilitate  the 
application  of  resolution  tools  and  manage 
resolution  effectively.  With  the  narrow 
exceptions of points (d) and (e), any intervention 
by  the  SBRF  aimed  at  shielding  shareholders 
and creditors from losses is ruled out: “the Fund 
shall not be used directly to absorb losses ... or 
recapitalise the bank” (Art. 71.3). 
It is envisaged that the Fund resources will be 
provided  by  the  financial  sector  with  ex  ante 
annual contributions (Article 66); in case of need 
these may be supplemented by extraordinary ex 
post contributions once the fund resources have 
been depleted (Article 67). Banks’ contributions 
will  be  calculated  with  reference  to  liabilities, 
excluding capital and guaranteed deposits, and 
the risk profile of the institution. The timescale 
for  fund-raising  (at  least  0.8%  of  guaranteed 
deposits within ten years) and the criteria for the 
determination of the contributions by financial 
institutions  will  be  determined  by  the 
Commission with a delegated act under Article 
82 of the Regulation, and will be enacted by the 
SRB.  A  two-thirds  majority  decision  by  the 
Board  is  necessary  to  decide  ex  post 
contributions when they exceed three times the 
amount  of  annual  contributions.  Were  funds 
raised ex ante and ex post to prove insufficient or 
not  immediately  available,  the  Regulation 
permits the SRB to tap alternative sources, e.g. 
by borrowing from financial institutions or other 
third parties (Article 69)17 and, as a last resort, 
from  national  resolution  funds  of  EU  member 
states not participating in the SRM (Article 68). 
These funding arrangements are very close, in 
nature,  to  those  envisaged  for  funding  the 
deposit  insurance  schemes;  they  share  with 
them  the  fundamental  nature  of  a  mutual 
insurance  arrangement  by  the  financial 
institutions,  where  the  commitment  of  public 
                                                   
17  The ECB legal opinion considers that the formulation 
of Article 69 is too vague, and fails to spell out clearly 
that  third  parties  could  include  temporary  access  to 
public funds.  
money  may  only  be  envisaged  in  extreme 
circumstances.  
The system cannot do away with the availability 
of  a  suitable  fiscal  backstop  mechanism  to 
ensure that resolution is completed in the public 
interest,  after  all  other  available  means  have 
been  exhausted,  notably  following  a  systemic 
crisis  threatening  to  bring  down  the  entire 
banking system. 
The first line of defence may well be performed 
by  the  ESM,  which  is  a  strongly  capitalised 
institution  already  empowered  to  assist  its 
member  states,  and  their  banks,  in  need  of 
financial  assistance.  The  ESM  may  grant 
financial  assistance  to  its  members  for  the 
specific  purpose  of  re-capitalising  financial 
institutions,  with  appropriate  conditionality 
(Article  15  of  the  ESM  Treaty),  “including 
through  schemes  to  support  asset  separation 
and disposal” (ESM 2013b, Article 2). It will also 
be  empowered  to  recapitalise  directly  ailing 
banks in its member states, once the SSM is fully 
operational, a decision taken to help break the 
vicious circle between banks and sovereigns (cf. 
Euro Area Summit Statement, 29 June 2012).  
While  the  operational  rules  for  these 
interventions are yet to be finalised, it has been 
agreed  that  they  shall  abide  by  the  state  aid 
rules,  including  associated  rules  for  national 
contributions  and  bail-in  of  private  creditors 
(ESM  2013a).  Therefore,  the  ESM  is  already 
entrusted with powers of intervention in bank 
crisis  management:  the  function  of  absorbing 
residual losses in resolution in case of a systemic 
crisis would represent but a natural extension of 
these powers, fully in line with its constitutive 
goals.  The  decision  to  let  the  ESM  intervene 
should  of  course  be  taken  according  to  its 
general decision-making mechanisms.  
In order to let the ESM play this role, its scope of 
operation  must  be  expanded  to  cover  all  SSM 
members, both as regards the recapitalisation of 
SSM  banks  in  non-euro  countries  and  the 
residual  fiscal  backstop:  an  issue  that  requires 
modification of the ESM statutes under which at 
present  only  eurozone  members  may  join  the 
ESM and benefit from its operations (Article 2). 
As  an  intermediate  arrangement,  one  may 
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contractual  arrangements  with  SSM  members 
not  using  the  euro  in  order  to  regulate  their 
contribution  to,  and  participation  in,  financial 
support  operations  for  banks  in  the  SSM  area 
and  the  fiscal  backstop,  alongside  statutory 
contributions by ESM members (cf. in the same 
line  Asmussen,  2013).  The  financial 
contributions of non-members would only cover 
interventions related to ailing banks, and not the 
general operations of the ESM. The key for these 
contributions  would  thus  be  determined  with 
reference  to  the  total  amount  of  funds 
committed for these specific purposes. 
The preservation of financial stability may still 
require the intervention of national budgets to 
stabilise the banking system – of course, once all 
other  sources  have  been  exhausted.  These 
contributions  should  be  agreed  in  advance  by 
the  Council  according  to  some  predetermined 
key (Goodhart & Schoenmaker, 2011; Carmassi 
et al., 2010); the Council should also specify in 
advance the procedure for this decision, so as to 
avoid creating unnecessary uncertainty in case 
of  need  (as  happened  repeatedly  until  the 
establishment  of  the  ESM  for  national support 
for countries under adjustment programmes). In 
order  to  maintain  the  principle  of  fiscal 
neutrality, as well as eliminate any pro-cyclical 
effects  of  the  intervention,  these  contributions 
should  be  made  available  through  credit  lines 
granted by member states to the SRM, and be 
subsequently recouped from the financial sector 
after the crisis subsides, as in the FDIC system 
(this solution is also advocated by the ECB legal 
opinion on the SRM). 
6.  The legal basis of the SRM 
Regulation 
The  SRM  Regulation  establishes  a  centralised 
decision-making  process;  its  rules  and 
procedure  will  be  applied  by  the  European 
Commission  together  with  a  new  EU  Agency 
(the  SRB)  and  the  resolution  authorities  of  the 
participating  member  states.  The  SRB  will 
implement its decisions by instructing national 
resolution authorities, which are legally obliged 
to  comply;  its  decisions  are  liable  to  impinge 
profoundly  on  property  rights  of  shareholders 
and creditors within the member states. 
The  legal  basis  of  the  proposal  is  Article  114 
TFEU,  enabling  the  European  Parliament  and 
the  Council  to  adopt  measures  for  the 
approximation  of  national  provisions  aimed  at 
the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market. As may be recalled, two notable features 
of Article 114 are co-decision by the European 
Parliament,  which  strengthens  legitimacy,  and 
majority voting within the Council. 
The adequacy of this legal basis was discussed 
in an opinion of the Legal Service of the Council 
of September 2013 which supported the choice 
but  made  some  suggestions  to  strengthen  the 
argument,  leading  in  turn  the  Presidency  to  a 
number  of  changes  and  clarifications  in  the 
original text of the proposal. 
The  main  issue  is  whether  the  envisaged 
centralisation  of  decision-making  is  strictly 
functional  to  the  harmonisation  process  to 
which  Article  114  refers.  The  arguments 
supporting this view are illustrated in Recitals 1 
to  12  of  the  proposal:  the  functioning  of  the 
internal  market  for  banking  services  is  under 
threat;  there  is  a  growing  risk  of  financial 
fragmentation  due  to  fears  of  contagion  and  a 
lack  of  confidence  in  other  national  banking 
systems  and  in  member  states’  capacity  to 
support  their  banks;  divergences  in  national 
resolution  rules  and  the  absence  of  a  unified 
decision-making process at EU level may further 
weaken confidence; resolution decisions taken at 
the  national  level  entail  a  risk  of  regulatory 
forbearance and may undermine the functioning 
of the internal market, leading to distortions of 
competition.  
The application of the SRM to only a subset of 
Union  member  states  may  be  “objectively” 
justified  as  strictly  related  (“imbricated”,  as 
characterised by Recital 6a of the Regulation) to 
the  scope  of  application  of  the  SSM;  the 
centralisation of supervision and resolution may 
thus  be  seen  as  closely  complementary  and 
mutually dependent.  
On the legal basis of the Regulation, two further 
issues have been discussed within the Council. 
First, with reference to the creation of the SBRF, 
levies  payable  by  credit  institutions  for 
financing  the  fund  are  not  to  be  regarded  as 
taxes,  but  as  consideration  for  (compulsory) 16 | MICOSSI, BRUZZONE & CARMASSI  
 
insurance  against  the  risk  of  resolution.  The 
provision  whereby  the  criteria  for  establishing 
the annual contribution of institutions will be set 
by the Commission taking into account their risk 
profiles (Articles 65-66 of the SRM Regulation) 
adds  weight  to  this  interpretation.  Moreover, 
Article 114 has been used as a legal basis also for 
setting  the  fees  that  financial  institutions must 
pay to the new European Supervisory Agencies 
for their services.  
A second issue is that, in order to use article 114 
TFEU as a legal basis, the funding of resolution 
should  under  no  circumstance  entail  member 
state  budgetary  liability,  also  throughout  the 
transitional  period  during  which  the  target 
funding level will be achieved. Accordingly, the 
proposal  under  discussion  states  that  no 
decision  of  the  Board  shall  require  member 
states to provide extraordinary public support, 
and that one main objective of resolution is to 
protect public funds by minimising reliance on 
extraordinary  financial  support.  As  a 
consequence, the fiscal back up will have to be 
set up as a separate legal arrangement between 
the participating member states, since voluntary 
participation  on  a  case  by  case  basis  could 
prejudge the confidence stabilising effects of the 
SRM.18 
While these are clear and convincing arguments, 
the question remains as to whether Article 114 
offers  a  proper  legal  basis  for  the  far-reaching 
powers  attributed  to  the  Commission  and  the 
SRB.  Indeed,  under  the  Regulation,  the 
Commission decision to start resolution de facto 
places the bank administration in public hands 
and  excludes  shareholders  and  management 
from all decisions. Once that decision is taken, 
the  SRB  will  have  extended  discretionary 
powers to steer the resolution process, including 
the  power  to  instruct  national  resolution 
authorities  on  the  specific  actions  required  to 
implement  the  resolution  scheme,  and  to 
intervene  directly  in  their  place  when  it 
considers that national resolution authorities are 
not  complying  with  the  Board  instructions,  in 
breach  of  Union  law.19  In  this  regard,  it  is 
legitimate to ask whether the principle of Article 
                                                   
18 On this, cf. also the ECB legal opinion.  
19 Article 26 of the SRM Regulation. 
345 TFEU, whereby the Treaty shall in no way 
prejudice  the  rules  in  the  member  states 
governing the system of property ownership, is 
consistent  with  the  SRM  power  to  overcome 
property rights of shareholders and creditors.  
The political sensitivity of the issue, covered by 
constitutional  rules  in  several  member  states, 
cannot be underestimated, even though it may 
be  mitigated  by  consideration  of  the 
counterfactual: as we have illustrated, the SRM 
is governed by the principle whereby creditors 
cannot  incur  greater  losses  than  they  would 
suffer  under  the  ordinary  national  insolvency 
procedure.20  
Historically,  few  EU  agencies  have  been 
established  on  the  legal  basis  of  Article  114 
(ENISA  and  the  new  European  financial 
supervisory  authorities,  EBA,  ESMA  and 
EIOPA). Some scholars consider it to be a shaky 
legal basis for radical institutional reform,21 and 
the first case concerning the ESMA Regulation 
has already been brought before the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) by the United Kingdom.22  
In  his  opinion  on  this matter,  delivered  on  12 
September 2013, Advocate General Jäaskinen of 
the European Court of Justice, while in general 
supporting the choice of Article 114 as a legal 
basis,  has  argued  that  this  is  not  the  case  for 
specific  powers  attributed  to  ESMA  by  Article 
28  of  the  Regulation,  whereby  ESMA  may 
overrule national authorities in the decision to 
ban short selling when there is a disagreement 
between  ESMA  and  the  competent  national 
authority,  or  between  national  authorities.  On 
this  AG  Jäaskinen  considers  that  we  are  not 
confronted with harmonisation but rather with a 
replacement  of  national  decision-making  with 
EU level decision-making – something for which 
Article 114 does not provide an adequate legal 
basis.  
Similar  questions  are  likely  to  be  raised  with 
regard to the SRM Regulation, since the SRB will 
be a distinctively powerful Union agency which, 
as  acknowledged  by  Recital  19  of  the  SRM 
                                                   
20 Article 16.1.f. of the Regulation. 
21 Moloney (2010); see also Busuioc (2013).  
22  Case  C-270/12,  United  Kingdom  v.  Council  of  the 
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Regulation, “departs from the model of all other 
agencies  in  the  Union”.  One  might  ask, 
therefore,  whether  Article  352  TFEU,  the 
residual  clause  for  Union  competence,  would 
not have provided a stronger legal basis for the 
radical  change  in  policies  and  power  brought 
about by the Regulation. The use of Article 352 
would require the Commission to draw national 
parliaments’ attention to the proposal, under the 
subsidiarity  monitoring  procedure.  Moreover, 
Article  352  would  require  unanimity  in  the 
Council,  which  would  have  the  advantage  of 
symmetry with the procedure based on Article 
127.6  TFEU,  used  for  the  establishment  of  the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism.  
The  main  weakness  of  solutions  centred  on 
Article  352  is  the  absence  of  the  European 
Parliament  as  a  co-legislator,  which  would 
weaken  legitimacy  (although,  since  the  Lisbon 
Treaty, the European Parliament is not merely 
consulted but must give its consent). Should use 
of Article 352 prove necessary, one possibility to 
maintain the role of Parliament as co-legislator 
would  be  to  resort  to  a  double  legal  basis 
(Article  114  and  Article  352),  with  use  of  the 
latter to strengthen the legal basis for the more 
intrusive  provisions  –  which  according  to  the 
ECJ is feasible, albeit not without difficulties.23 
Should it eventually prove necessary to use both 
Articles 114 and 352 as legal bases, the decision-
making  procedure  could  be  designed  so  as  to 
preserve  an  adequate  role  for  Parliament 
alongside unanimity voting in the Council.  
                                                   
23 The ECJ has accepted the use of multiple legal bases 
when  a  legislative  act  pursues  several  goals  or  has 
several  components  that  cannot  be  separated, 
conditional on the decision procedures being “mutually 
compatible” (cf. C-155/07 of 6 November 2008). In case 
C-338/01 of 29 April 2004, which referred to the joint 
application of Article 95 TEC (now Article 114 TFEU) 
and Articles 93 and 94 TEC (now Articles 113 and 115 
TFEU, i.e. special rules with respect to Article 114), the 
ECJ  considered  that  procedures  with  different  voting 
thresholds (QMV v. unanimity) and entailing a different 
involvement of the European Parliament could not be 
applied together (paragraph 58). On the other hand, in 
case 165/87 of 27 September 1988 the ECJ accepted the 
use  of  a  double  legal  basis  for  a  Council  decision, 
despite  the  two  legal  bases  involving  different  voting 
majorities. 
A  separate  legal  issue  is  whether  the  powers 
granted  to  the  Commission,  the  Board  and 
national resolution authorities by the regulation 
are compatible with the EU Treaty, notably as 
regards the institutional balance of powers. 
The bulk of resolution actions is performed by 
the  SRB,  an  independent  agency  whose 
decisions  should  be  shielded  from  all  political 
interference  (but  on  this  negotiations  in  the 
Council are not over yet). Beyond preparing the 
draft  decisions  for  the  Commission,  the  Board 
draws  up  resolution  plans  and  identifies 
measures  to  remove  impediments  to 
resolvability,  which  will  be  implemented  by 
national  resolution  authorities;  sets  minimum 
requirements  for  own  funds  and  eligible 
liabilities;  adopts  schemes  for  the  use  of 
resolution  tools,  within  the  framework 
established by the Commission.  
National  resolution  authorities  participate  as 
auxiliary  bodies  with  the  twofold  task  of 
cooperating with the Board in the exercise of its 
duties  and  implementing  the  decisions  of  the 
Board.  The  Board  “closely  monitors”  the 
execution of resolution schemes at national level 
and may intervene directly with respect to third 
parties  when  national  authorities  have  not 
implemented decisions following EU rules. 
However,  the  Commission,  invested  with 
political  and  institutional  strength  from  its 
formal status of Union institution under Articles 
13  and  17  TEU,  has  the  task  of  adopting  the 
most intrusive decisions: whether or not to put 
an  entity  under  resolution,  the  framework  for 
the  use  of  resolution  tools and  the  framework 
for the use of the Fund (normally, on the basis of 
drafts  prepared  by  the  Board);  upon 
recommendation  of  the  Board  or  on  its  own 
initiative, whether the power to write down or 
convert capital instruments should be exercised, 
singly or together with a resolution action; and 
direct  application,  with  no  involvement  of  the 
Board, of Treaty rules on state aid.  
Assessing  this  system  within  the  strict 
framework of the Meroni doctrine (delegation of 
powers from the Commission to other bodies)24 
                                                   
24 ECJ, case 10/56, 13 June 1958, Meroni v. High Authority 
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may be misleading. As clearly explained by AG 
Jäaskinen  in  his  opinion  on  the  ESMA  case, 
under Article 291 of the TFEU the competences 
of agencies – and therefore also the SRB – may 
derive  directly  from  a  legislative  act;  and  the 
Treaty expressly provides for judicial review of 
their  acts  by  the  ECJ.25  EU  legislation  has 
already  granted  significant  implementing 
powers  to  agencies  and  this  course  of  action 
appears  particularly  appropriate  when 
“complex technical assessments” are needed in 
order to implement an EU measure. 
What remains a fundamental requirement is that 
the powers granted to the SRM by the regulation 
are  sufficiently  well  defined  so  as  to  preclude 
not  only  an  arbitrary  exercise  of  power,  but 
more generally that the Board takes “economic 
policy”  decisions  –  notably  including  the 
decisions  to  open  resolution,  in  light  of  the 
public  interest  to  preserve  financial  stability, 
and to establish the frameworks for the use of 
resolution tools and of the Fund. In this regard, 
more  precise  legislative  constraints  on 
implementing  powers  have  been  advocated 
within the Council.26 The subsequent versions of 
the  Regulation  have  specified  the  criteria  for 
                                                   
25  In  his  opinion,  AG  Jäaskinen  underscores  that 
agencies necessarily have to be precluded from Article 
290 delegations of powers “because the exercise of such 
powers  changes  the  normative  content  of  legislative 
acts, albeit with respect to their non-essential elements”, 
and agencies cannot participate in the system of inter-
institutional checks and balances established by Article 
290(2). Delegated powers can only be exercised by an 
EU  institution  that  is  democratically  accountable,  in 
other  words  by  the  Commission,  which  is  ultimately 
accountable  to  the  European  Parliament.  A  similar 
restriction  does  not  apply  to  Article  291  TFEU 
implementing  powers.  Although  agencies  are  not 
expressly mentioned as subjects to whom implementing 
powers can be conferred at the EU level, there are no 
fundamental  constitutional  principles  preventing  the 
legislator from conferring such powers on agencies “as 
a  midway  solution  between  vesting  implementing 
authority in either the Commission or the Council, on 
the one hand, or leaving it to the Member States, on the 
other”. See also Repasi (2013). 
26 The original proposal already contained a number of 
principles  and  criteria  to  be  respected  by  the 
Commission  and  the  Board  in  the  exercise  of  their 
implementing powers (see, in particular, Articles 6, 12, 
13,  14,  15  and  16)  and,  more  specifically,  the  use  of 
resolution tools. 
implementing  actions  in several  aspects  of  the 
proposal. 
Of  course,  it  would  be  unrealistic  to  imagine 
that  the  resolution  mechanism  can  operate 
without  the  exercise  of  discretionary  powers, 
both by the Commission and the Board; but in 
the  recent  Presidency  compromise  text 
discretion  has  been  more  precisely  limited  to 
what  is  required  to  achieve  the  resolution 
objectives, and has been allocated between the 
Commission  and  the  Board  in  a  manner  that 
seems  in  line  with  the  Treaty.  A  critical 
provision  in  this  regard  is  that  only  the 
Commission  shall  balance  the  objectives  of 
resolution  “as  appropriate  to  the  nature  and 
circumstances of each case” (Article 12.3 of the 
Regulation).  
The balance of the system is completed by the 
provisions  ensuring  on  the  one  hand  the 
political  accountability  of  the  SRM  to  the 
European Parliament and national parliaments27 
and, on the other hand, the judicial review of all 
decisions affecting individual rights. 
7.  Conclusions 
The SRM Regulation and BRR Directive offer a 
comprehensive framework for the resolution of 
banks  and  banking groups  at  EU  level,  which 
complements  the  SSM  to  ensure  that  moral 
hazard  is  eradicated  from  European  banking 
and  financial  markets.  Critical  aspects  to  this 
end are the transfer of resolution decisions from 
national  supervisory  authorities  to  a  Single 
Resolution  Mechanism  that  should  operate  in 
full independence from national authorities and 
all  political  interference  at  Union  level.  Any 
direct  role  of  the  Council  of  the  Union  in 
resolution  decisions  should  be  excluded  as  it 
would utterly destroy the credibility of the SRM. 
The  proposed  system  appears  to  be  well 
designed  on  the  whole  and  respectful  of  the 
institutional balance of powers dictated by the 
Treaty. However, some specific aspects may be 
improved  with  a  view  to  ameliorating  the 
effectiveness and legal strength of the SRM. In 
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particular,  we  have  argued  that  the  following 
changes are desirable: 
On  the  initiation  of  resolution,  in  order  to 
streamline  and  speed  up  the  procedure,  the 
assessment that a bank is failing or likely to fail, 
and that no private or supervisory alternative is 
available,  should  be  left  to  the  ECB  (in  its 
supervisory  role)  and  national  resolution 
authorities, as the last act of early intervention. 
Accordingly, the Commission should in practice 
focus its intervention on verifying the existence 
of  the  public  interest  conditions  that  are 
required to open resolution. The decision to start 
resolution should normally be initiated after the 
close  of  business  on  Friday  afternoon  and  be 
completed before markets reopen. 
On  bail-in,  we  have  proposed  that  the 
requirement  for  banks  to  have  sufficient  bail-
inable liabilities could in part be translated into 
an obligation to issue debentures automatically 
convertible into equity when capital (evaluated 
at market price) falls below certain thresholds. 
This would greatly strengthen market discipline 
on shareholders and management. We have also 
underscored  the  need  for  flexibility  in  the 
application of bail-in where there is an injection 
of  public  funds  into  a  solvent  financial 
institution, be that by national authorities or the 
ESM,  so  as  to  avoid  unwanted  destabilising 
effects  when  a  capital  shortfall  is  ascertained 
and becomes known to the public. This will be 
especially  important  in  view  of  the 
comprehensive  and  ambitious  asset  quality 
review that the ECB and EBA will launch in the 
coming  months,  possibly  leading  to  the 
conclusion that a major ‘precautionary’ injection 
of  funds  may  be  needed  in  parts  of  the  EU 
banking system. 
On the Resolution Fund, our main proposition 
is  that  it  must  be  supranational  and  that  a 
collection of national funds would not do. The 
Fund  would  be  paid  by  financial  institutions 
participating in the SRM and would not require 
any support from national budgetary resources. 
This, however, does not eliminate, for the sake 
of the very credibility of the SRM, the need to 
establish a last-resort fiscal backup for the Fund, 
to  be  activated  in  exceptional  circumstances 
such as a systemic shock affecting large parts of 
the  Union  banking  system.  In  this  regard,  the 
first line of defence can be provided by the ESM, 
with  appropriate  changes  in  its  membership, 
and subsequently, in extreme cases of systemic 
banking crisis, by national budgets. The rules for 
tapping  these  backstops  and  the  contribution 
keys by the member states should be agreed in 
advance, lest they become the subject of frantic 
and  divisive  negotiations  should  a  major 
financial shock materialise. These funds should 
be repaid by financial institutions as soon as the 
crisis subsides. The SRM credibility requires that 
the system be completed by a fiscal backstop, 
which may be guaranteed in the first place by 
the ESM and as a last resort by national budgets.  
Finally, we have discussed two legal aspects of 
the SRM design, and notably its legal basis and 
the  balance  of  powers  between  the  different 
bodies  involved  in  the  resolution  procedures. 
On the first aspect, were Article 114 to prove an 
inadequate  legal  basis  for  the  exercise  of 
centralised resolution powers deeply impinging 
on  individual  property  rights,  it  might  be 
necessary  to  consider,  only  in  this  respect,  the 
joint  resort  also  to  Article  352.  On  the  second 
aspect, we have stressed the critical role of the 
Commission,  which  must  be  preserved  as 
proposed, in taking the key decisions affecting 
property  rights  in  the  procedure,  thus  better 
underpinning  their  legality  and  political 
accountability under the Treaty. 20 | MICOSSI, BRUZZONE & CARMASSI  
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